Abstract
I Introduction

This paper examines the decision of the High Court of Australia (HCA) in Clark v
Macourt, which was delivered on the 18 December 2013. 1 The subject matter of the case was described as having a "peculiar" or "unusual" nature, being a stock of frozen donor sperm. 2 Macourt was ordered to pay $1,246,025.01 for a breach of warranty by his fertility clinic. The contract price was a mere $386,950.91.
In summary, the case is about first principles that govern the award of damages in breach of contract cases. In particular, there are two approaches that have emerged from the case.
On one hand, the primary judge's approach gained support from the majority in the HCA, 3 and on the other hand, the approach of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (NSWCA) gained some, but not full, support from the dissenting judge in the HCA. 4 The main suggestion of the paper is that the Clark v Macourt majority decision should not be followed if a similar case arises in New Zealand or any other jurisdiction. It is agreed by many, if not all, that the compensatory principle is the ruling principle in breach of contract damages cases, yet its application has caused much judicial disagreement. 5 Arguably, Clark v Macourt is another case where the compensatory principle was applied incorrectly. More specifically, the HCA majority failed to apply the law on mitigation correctly. As a result, Clark was placed in a position superior to that which she would have been in had the contract been performed. Thus, it is suggested that the approach of the NSWCA, despite some difficulties of its own, is the better approach to follow in a similar fact scenario. Also, as a result, Clark charged her patients an amount no greater than the amount she herself spent to acquire the donated sperm. Ethically, practitioners were prohibited from making profits when using sperm for treatment purposes. Clark's patient fee covered most of the cost and expense to her in acquiring the replacement sperm because Clark claimed there was always a "buffer" between the real costs to her and those she passed on to her patients. 11 The meaning of this is taken to be that if the overall cost to Clark was A, she charged her patient price B (A>B) to ensure there was always a difference. Clark never wished to be viewed as making profits when using sperm in treatment, as that would have been unethical 12 and later illegal as codified in a statute. Furthermore, the Court found that up to the date of trial Clark had mitigated her prima facie loss, Xytex replacement sperm cost, by charging her patients a fee covering that cost. 36 Clark achieved mitigation to "the maximum extent allowed by the legal and ethical constraints under which she operated". 37 Therefore, Clark was only entitled to damages for that part of the overall replacement cost incurred that was not covered by her patients up to the date of trial, together with a capitalised value amount for that part of the overall cost that it could be expected Clark might not be able to recoup for the remaining number of straws she was still left to replace.
38
Thus, by allowing the appeal, Clark was awarded no damages because the replacement cost for 1,546 straws from Xytex was recouped and it was assumed that the replacement cost would continue on being recouped from her patients as Clark continues on sourcing the remaining straws from Xytex (1,996 -1,546 = 450). 
V The Compensatory Principle
The most important principle that should always be reflected in each and every damages award for a breach of contract is the compensatory principle. Parke B in Robinson v
Harman enunciated that:
49
The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.
The High Court of Australia has repeatedly affirmed this on various occasions. 50 The aim is to substitute the expected performance of a contract with a monetary awardclaimant's expectation interest -because that performance was lost due to the breach.
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This award can also be described as expectation damages, which protects the expectation interest of the claimant.
52
A Recent Case Law
In The Golden Victory, all members of the House of Lords agreed that the compensatory principle is the ruling principle of contract law damages, despite having a split of 3:2 as to the final result in the decision. Since the court is dealing with a question concerning the assessment of damages, and since there has been no clear decision of an appellate court which is binding on the court and pursuant to which the application of the contractual principles regarding an accepted repudiation has led to an award of damages which puts the innocent party in a better position than he would have been in had the contract been performed, I
have concluded that the court should follow the compensatory principle endorsed by the House of Lords in The Golden Victory.
All judges in Clark v Macourt, including those in the lower courts, agreed with the compensatory principle, and most mentioned its corollary: an award of damages should not place the plaintiff in a position superior to that which he or she would have occupied had the contract been performed. 60 However, the problem in Clark v Macourt was, as
Hayne J stated, the application of the ruling principle to the facts. value -actual position. In this situation, the formula for the difference in value, and thus the damages quantum, would be X -Y.
It must now be highlighted and remembered that this formula is subject to various limiting principles, such as causation, remoteness and mitigation, which will be discussed later in the paper.
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C HCA Majority Decision
In contrast to NSWCA, all judges in the HCA thought that it made no particular difference whether the contract was for the sale of goods or a contract for the sale of a business. 68 The majority in the HCA stated that Clark's loss, or her expectation interest, This paper argues that the majority judges have failed to apply the law on mitigation correctly. From their individual judgments, it seems like the Judges assumed that the calculation of the difference in value had to be assessed solely at the date of breach. This approach allowed them to disregard legally the events that followed post breach. As it will become more apparent below, the law on mitigation is actually built into the difference in value measure. Thus, in order for the ruling compensatory principle of contract law to have been given effect to, it was crucial for the events post breach in
Clark v Macourt to have been properly analysed.
D Dissenting Judgment
Gageler J decided that the asset (frozen sperm) which the company was obliged to deliver under the contract.
In other words, Gageler J suggested that St George sperm was always going to be used in the treatment of Clark's patients in the normal course of her practice. 77 As already mentioned, the ethical guidelines prohibited Clark from charging her patients a fee above her own acquisition costs and expenses; 78 Clark could never make a profit on these assets. 79 Therefore, because of this limited value of the asset and the fact that Clark would have never re-sold these assets in the market, the fundamental justification for the standard difference in value measure of damages was displaced.
In particular, Gageler J emphasised Clark's ability to use compliant sperm for the treatment of her patients. 80 Any loss Clark suffered was the extra cost she incurred when she was forced to place herself in the position of using compliant sperm in treating her patients when St George sperm was found to be unusable. It is important to note at this point that Gageler J did not discuss the law on mitigation, but instead held that the normal difference in value measure of calculating damages was displaced in view of the limited value of the stock to Clark.
E Robert Stevens' Rights Model
This section of the paper discusses the "rights model" that has gained some support in academic literature. 84 Stevens believes that the primary right to performance of a contract is created upon the voluntary entry into a contract, 85 and so "[t]he infringement of the primary right to performance gives rise to a secondary right to damages which did not exist prior to breach." 86 Therefore, an award of substantial damages acts in substitution of the infringed right of the claimant; hence, the term Stevens uses -substitutive damages.
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Substitutive damages require an objective assessment to be made at the moment of the infringement; thus, the date of assessment for the court is the date of breach.
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Substitutive damages are available even if the loss as a matter of fact is not suffered because "damages seek to achieve the closest position to the wrong not having occurred". 89 Stevens believes that damages should be quantified according to the degree of seriousness of the infringed contractual right.
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According to Stevens, consequential losses are also recoverable but, as opposed to being objectively assessed, they must be proved by the claimant. 94 Thus, consequential losses are assessed at the time of the judgment. 95 More importantly, the "breach of contract does not fall into the category of wrongs which require the proof of consequential loss before substantial damages will be awarded". 96 On this point, Stevens also emphasised that mitigation and remoteness are questions only to be discussed when calculating the consequential loss, but are not questions to be discussed when calculating the value of the infringed right. 97 In other words, there is no need to inquire into mitigation or remoteness when the difference in value is assessed.
F Criticism of Robert Stevens
Andrew Burrows and James Edelman offer the main critique of the rights model,
suggesting it is "a radical and novel reinterpretation of the law". 98 Burrows argues: (a) the "rights-based approach" would trigger a right to substantial damages for each and every wrong; 99 (b) it contradicts the law on mitigation because post breach events would not be legally considered; 100 (c) this in itself goes against courts' practice that does inquire into events subsequent to the breach; 101 (d) it does not leave any room for an award of nominal damages; 102 and (e) it would be meaningless to assess the value of the right without considering the consequential impact of infringement because there is an obvious overlap between damages for the infringed right and the compensatory consequential damages.
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In addition, Edelman pointed out that the rights model causes one to be entitled to the full value of the right to a thing without any regard to the seriousness of the damage. 104 In other words, placing too much focus on the value of the right that has been infringed would render the nature of that infringement and its consequences as irrelevant.
105
Moreover, the approach would lead to double recovery if the claimant is permitted an award of damages for the infringement of its right and for any consequential losses. placed Clark in one million dollars superior position than if the contract had been performed. In other words, the majority did not adequately discuss or give any proper effect to the law on mitigation, which would have reduced the quantum of damages; so, it is thoroughly discussed next in this paper.
VI The Law on Mitigation A The Three Rules
McGregor on Damages sets out three rules that govern the law on mitigation. 116 Firstly, a claimant is not permitted to recover for avoidable loss. 117 Secondly, any expenses incurred by the claimant throughout the reasonable mitigating act are recoverable.
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Thirdly, a claimant is prevented from recovering for avoided loss. 119 It is the last of these rules that is discussed in this paper because, in agreement with NSWCA, it is suggested that Clark has avoided her prima facie loss by passing the cost of the replacement Xytex sperm on to her patients. In other words, Clark has fully mitigated her loss and, thus, she
should not have been awarded $1,246,025.01.
B Avoided Loss
Avoided loss has been described as a "topic of great difficulty" 120 and the law on the topic is "in a dreadful muddle" 121 or "a bit of a jumble". … when in the course of his business he has taken action arising out of the transaction, which action has diminished his loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered may be taken into account even though there was no duty on him to act.
This is taken to mean that even if the claimant goes beyond his or her duty to mitigate, and in doing so reduces his or her loss, those benefits ought to be taken into account when assessing the damages. This is done because one must "look at what actually happened, and to balance loss and gain". 126 However, there is an important qualification; the act of the claimant or "[t]he subsequent transaction, if to be taken into account, must be one arising out of the consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of business." 127 In other words, the transaction has to be a "part of a continuous dealing with the situation … and … not an independent or disconnected transaction", so as not to be considered as res inter alios acta. McGregor discusses the topic using collateral benefits that are not discounted because they are res inter alios acta. 133 David McLauchlan uses offsetting gains to denote any benefits or advantages accruing to the claimant post breach that must reduce the damages award.
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In this paper, the term "offsetting gains" is used to describe any advantages or benefits that the claimant acquires directly as a result of any mitigating act. These offset the primary loss to some degree. For example, in Clark v Macourt, Clark has acquired Xytex sperm for treatment once she could no longer use St George sperm because of the breach.
It was found by Gzell J that Xytex had provided more extensive information about their donors, 135 and that Clark negotiated an exclusive deal with Xytex where she was the only purchaser in NSW. 136 Furthermore, Clark had actually saved costs by acquiring replacement sperm in portions as when required instead of having to store the St George sperm even if the latter were compliant. 137 The HCA majority should have properly considered these advantages Clark gained as a result of her mitigating act.
This paper suggests that any other actions that are undertaken to avoid the consequences of the loss are all part of the avoided loss umbrella, or similarly a part of the bigger mitigation umbrella. However, an enquiry must be made whether or not the action or transaction is res inter alios acta. For example, in Clark v Macourt, the mitigating act was the acquisition of replacement sperm; but, it is further argued that Clark's action of charging her patients a fee that covered the acquisition and related costs, was not res inter alios acta but actually a part of the act undertaken to avoid the consequences of Clark's prima facie loss.
The reason that the arrangement to charge her patients a fee was not res inter alios acta is because it was a part of a continuous dealing with the situation that Clark has found herself in after the breach. On the facts of the case, in 2005, Clark had begun acquiring Xytex replacement sperm in small portions whenever she needed it in treatment, and this is obviously interlinked with the fee that she was going to charge her patients for that particular treatment. As NSWCA made clear, "it was perfectly legal and ethical for
[Clark] to so charge her patients". 138 In contrast, what Clark did not do on the facts was to go into the market to acquire the full amount of straws from Xytex (ie 1,996 straws) and then decide to enter into contracts with her patients for the treatment, in which case the fees charged to patients could be viewed as independent transactions. In other words, as it happened on the facts of the case, Clark's mitigating act (ie the purchase of replacement sperm) and her charge made to the patients must be viewed as one and whole transaction that was definitely completed by Clark to avoid the consequences of the breach. In doing so, Clark had fully reduced her primary loss.
C Andrew Dyson and Adam Kramer
In their article, Dyson and Kramer analyse the compensatory principle, the law on mitigation and the difference in value measure to arrive at various conclusions, some of 
D HCA Majority Judgments
Hayne J said that Clark did not gain any benefits from her purchase and use of replacement sperm, nor was she any worse off "than she was before she undertook those transactions". 151 Moreover, according to his Honour, simply showing that Clark could or did charge her patients a fee that covered her replacement sperm cost was irrelevant.
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With respect, as a result of acquiring Xytex sperm Clark gained direct benefits -or offsetting gains -already mentioned above: an exclusive deal, saved expenses and extensive information on donors. Moreover, it is the whole underlying purpose of the law on avoided loss that any action taken to avoid the consequences of the breach that result in a reduction of the claimant's loss must be taken into account; this includes an action of passing on the incurred costs to third parties, as long as the arrangement is not res inter alios acta -this was also discussed above with respect to Clark v Macourt. It is worth repeating Clark's concession that the charges she made to her patients "equalled the acquisition and other costs incurred by her".
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Crennan and Bell JJ rejected the mitigation argument on the basis that Clark's dealings with patients "did not avoid, or increase or diminish, the loss of her bargain for delivery However, as mentioned earlier, Clark never claimed these extra expenses in damages, thus, she was unable to recover them from Macourt.
When discussing betterment, Keane J rejected the argument because there was no evidence to establish "extra profitability attributable to the use of Xytex sperm". 164 In deciding so, his Honour limited the law on betterment to the particular facts of British Westinghouse, where extra profitability was gained by the claimant because of the higher efficiency of the newly purchased replacement goods.
With respect, this is incorrect because Clark acquired direct benefits from the superiority of Xytex stock when compared to warranty compliant St George straws. It is unnecessary to limit offsetting gains to situations where the benefits gained solely lead to claimant's extra profitability. If properly understood, the requirement proposed by Viscount Haldane is that the benefits are taken into account if the action undertaken by the claimant leads to a reduction of his or her losses. 165 Moreover, in Clark v Macourt, because of regulations, medical practitioners could not make any profit when using sperm in treatment. Therefore, it is wrong to tell Macourt that there were no offsetting gains against Clark's primary loss simply because there was no extra profitability, when in actual fact, no profit could be made from the sperm when it was used in treatment. Overall, the only matter left for the counsel would have been to properly quantify these offsetting gains, or put a number on them, so that this would have ultimately reduced the damages bill awarded against Macourt.
VII Conclusion on Clark v Macourt
Compensatory principle is the fundamental ruling principle that should be applied to each and every award of damages for breach of contract. I have attempted to show that the majority judges in Clark v Macourt did not apply the compensatory principle correctly to the facts of the case because their Honours failed to give proper attention to the law on mitigation. More specifically, Clark has recouped her replacement sperm costs from her patients, and in doing so she fully reduced her primary loss. Additionally, Clark gained direct advantages and benefits from the superiority of Xytex stock when compared to compliant St George sperm, which should have been properly treated as offsetting gains.
As a result, because of a failure to apply the law on mitigation correctly, Clark was placed in a superior position, to the extent of over a million dollars, than if the contract had been performed. As Macourt's counsel put it:
166 … the effect of the primary judge's award of damages is that Dr Clark will have been reimbursed twice for the expense of purchasing replacement Xytex sperm: first by her patients and, secondly, by order of the court.
As it was made more apparent, there is a strong link between the HCA majority reasoning and Robert Stevens' rights model and his substitutive damages. The latter approach has attracted much valid criticism and, therefore, the HCA majority decision is deserving of the same fate. On one hand, the decision, being so consistent with Stevens' approach, is "superficially attractive" because it advocates for the 'breach date rule' and a simple difference in value calculation exercise. 167 Surely it may bring "finality and certainty to commercial dealings" as Keane J said. 168 On another hand, the approach and the decision are "ultimately flawed" because the HCA majority judges paid little attention to the law on mitigation. 169 Importantly, Dyson and Kramer emphasise that "the difference in value measure is an application of mitigation where there is an available market", and thus, there is no 'breach date rule' properly so-called. 170 In their Honour's attempt to give proper effect to the compensatory principle, it was necessary for the HCA judges to analyse the law on mitigation in more detail. However, this was not done.
Lastly, it will be recalled that Clark in her pleadings asked for "something equivalent to the value of the worthless Sperm", which if read literally means she asked for an award of $0 because worthless sperm would have realised nothing. 171 Ironically, Keane J stated that Clark "was entitled to frame her claim in the manner most advantageous to her, and to have that claim determined". 172 Their Honours did not determine that claim when they "erroneously compensated" Clark with $1,246,025.01, when she literally claimed $0 (a figure she arguably should have been awarded!). 
